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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. EQUAL PROTECTION-THE GUEST STATUTE
In Ramey v. Ramey,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held the South Carolina Automobile Guest Statute2 unconstitu-
tional as violative of the equal protection clauses of the South
Carolina3 and United States4 Constitutions. The guest statute
provides that a nonpaying passenger injured in a motor vehicle
collision may not bring a cause of action against the owner or
operator of the vehicle "unless such accident shall have been in-
tentional on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his
reckless disregard of the rights of others."5 In Barney, plaintiff
sued her husband for injuries she sustained while a gratuitous
passenger in his automobile." In his answer defendant denied
that the collision resulted from intentional or reckless, willful, or
wanton misconduct in the operation of his vehicle within the
terms of the guest statute.
The lower court granted plaintiff's motion to strike the por-
tion of defendant's answer that pertained to the guest statute,
holding that the "statute was inherently unconstitutional be-
cause there 'was no rational justification for singling out persons
injured in automobile accidents as different from all others in-
1. - S.C. -, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979). See Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law, 32 S.C.L. REv. 203, 215 (1980).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-290 (1976).
3. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-290 (1976). This section provides:
No person transported by an owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for
damages against such motor vehicle or its owner or operator for injury, death
or loss in case of an accident unless such accident shall have been intentional
on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his
reckless disregard of the rights of others.
This section shall not relieve a public carrier or any owner or operator of a
motor vehicle which is being demonstrated to a prospective purchaser of re-
sponsibility for any injuries sustained by a passenger while being transported
by such public carrier or while such motor vehicle is being so demonstrated.
6. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 883.
7. Id.
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jured in negligent torts .. . ,," The sole question on appeal
was whether the guest statute was inherently unconstitutional as
violative of the equal protection clauses of the South Carolina
and United States Constitutions. The South Carolina Supreme
Court concluded that it was.
The common law imposed on automobile owners and driv-
ers a duty of ordinary or reasonable care toward nonpaying pas-
sengers.9 Since 1927,10 however, twenty-seven states11 have en-
acted guest statutes that substantially alter this common-law
duty. Under these statutes a nonpaying passenger can recover
from his driver host only upon a showing "of some form of
aggravated misconduct. ' 12 Even though the statutory language
differs among jurisdictions, the purposes underlying each guest
statute are the same: "(1) the protection of host drivers from
suits by ungrateful guests; . . . (2) the elimination of collusive
lawsuits," 13 and the minimization of automobile liability insur-
ance rates.
14
With the advent of widespread automobile liability insur-
ance, however, academic and judicial forums increasingly have
criticized guest statutes. Both have begun to question seriously
whether the guest statutes actually promote the underlying leg-
islative purposes. 1e Prior to 1973, however, there was only 'one
8. Id. (quoting Record at 10).
9. Comment, The Case Against the Guest Statute, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 321, 322
(1966).
10. Connecticut was the first state to enact an automobile guest statute. 1927 Conn.
Pub. Acts ch. 308.
11. The twenty-six states that enacted guest statutes during this period are: Ala-
bama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. 3 Wvo. L. J. 225 (1949).
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 186 (4th ed. 1971).
13. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 884. The appellant analogized "a gratuitous guest
who sues his host ... to the dog in the old proverb that bites the hand that feeds him."
Brief of Appellant at 16.
14. See Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 677, 232 N.W.2d
636, 645 (1975).
15. See, e.g., Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1934); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.
3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Stevens .v. Stevens, 355 Mich. 363, 94
N.W.2d 858 (1959); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 34 (4th ed. 1971); Lambert, Tort Laws, 35 Am. TR u
LAW. Ass'N L.J. 46, 47 (1974); Gibson, Guest Passenger Discrimination, 6 ALTA. L. REV.
211 (1968); Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest
2
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successful constitutional challenge to a state guest statute;"6
courts typically found the statutes to be within the legislature's
police power.17
In 1973, the California Supreme Court overturned that
state's guest statute on constitutional grounds in Brown v.
Merlo.18 Since then, eight other states also have held their guest
statutes invalid,"' but, in nearly the same time period, thirteen
states have upheld their statutes against constitutional attack.2 0
Although Ramey was the first case to come before the South
Carolina Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the
state's guest statute,21 the United States Supreme Court in the
1929 case of Silver v. Silver 2 found an identical Connecticut
statute23 to be constitutional.2 4 The South Carolina Supreme
Court distinguished Silver from Ramey 25 and held that the
traditional justifications for the statute did not constitute "a ra-
tional basis for the differential treatment spawned by the
statute."
26
The appropriate equal protection test set forth by the South
Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1968); Weinstein, Should We Kill the Guest Passen-
ger Act? 33 DEW. LAW 185 (1965); Note, The Case Against the Guest Statute, 7 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 321 (1966).
16. See Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 534, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
17. See note 20 infra.
18. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
19. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973);
Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751,
518 P.2d 362 (1974); Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232
N.W.2d 636 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d
574 (1975); McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975); Johnson v. Hassett,
217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975);
Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo. 1978).
20. See Beaseley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288, 315 So. 2d 570 (1975); White v. Hughes,
257 Ark. 627, 519 S.W.2d 70 (1975); Richardson v. Hansen, 186 Colo. 346, 527 P.2d 536
(1974); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974); Bickford v. Nolen, 240 Ga. 255, 240
S.E.2d 24 (1977); Delaney v. Badame, 49 Ill. 2d 168, 274 N.E.2d 353 (1971); Sidle v.
Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976); Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687
(Iowa 1974); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165, 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); Duerst v.
Limbocker, 269 Or. 252, 525 P.2d 99 (1974); Behrns v. Burke, 89 S.D. 96, 229 N.W.2d 86
(1975); Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Cannon v. Oviatt, 520
P.2d 883 (Utah 1974).
21. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 884 n.3.
22. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
23. 1927 Conn. Pub. Acts ch. 308.
24. 280 U.S. at 123-24.
25. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 885.
26. Id.
3
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Carolina Supreme Court in Ramey, is a minimum rationality
standard, that requires merely that the classification be ration-
ally related to the purpose of the" statute. If a statute satisfies
this test, then it must be upheld as a valid exercisie of the legis-
lature's authority. The test is the same as that used to strike
down the automobile comparative negligence statute2 in Marley
v. Kirby.29
Arguably, however, the court, failed to adhere to its own
equal protection analysis in Ramey. First, the court found that
the "protection of hospitality" argument has lost its force as jus-
tification for "differential treatment of automobile guests as dis-
tinguished from all other recipients of a host's generosity. Our
compulsory insurance law, which requires every policy to afford
uninsured motorist coverage to the insured, defeats the hospital-
ity argument upon which most prior cases have relied."30 Al-
though not explaining why such insurance coverage defeats the
rationale, the court apparently concurs with the reasoning
in Brown v. Merlo,31 in which the California Supreme Court
declared:
First, if the characterization of an injured guest's lawsuit
as an act of "ingratitude" ever had general validity, its ration-
ality has been completely eroded by the development of almost
universal automobile liability insurance coverage in recent
years.... today with the widespread prevalence of insurance
coverage, it is the insurance company, and not the generous
host, that in the majority of instances wins protection under
the guest statute. Thus, in a day in which nearly 85 percent of
automobile drivers carry liability insurance, the statute can no
longer sequester the defense that it is a necessary means to
thwart "ungrateful" guests. In plain language, there is simply
no notion of "ingratitude" in suing your host's insurer.32
The opinion of the court in Ramey, however, failed to con-
sider the possibility of a judgment in excess of the required lia-
bility insurance coverage. The difference between the judgment
27. Id.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (1976).
29. 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
30. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 885.
31. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
32. Id. at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 32
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amount and the insurance coverage amount would fall on the
driver or owner. The Georgia Supreme Court, addressed this is-
sue in the recent case of Bickford v. Nolen,33 and noted addi-
tionally that the host risks cancellation of insurance or a sub-
stantial increase in premiums. It concluded that "[a]lthough
these reasons may not be absolute they are strongly persuasive,
and they do satisfy the test of equal protection. The classifica-
tion of guest passenger bears a fair and substantial relation to a
valid purpose of the rule." 4 The Georgia court preferred to
leave the "final determination of values" to the legislature.3 5 It is
apparent, then, that the advent of compulsory insurance cover-
age has not totally dispensed with the hospitality rationale.
Secondly, the court found the "collusion prevention" ration-
ale to be unpersuasive, declaring that "[a]lthough the guest stat-
ute may prevent some collusive suits between hosts and their
passengers, the statute's overinclusiveness is devastating as it
operates to bar the great majority of valid claims." 6 The proper
manner to "ferret out fraudulent actions," concluded the court,
"is to impose existing civil law sanctions rather than to exclude
an entire class of claims. '37 Again, however, the court failed to
satisfactorily explain the argument that it is reasonable to as-
sume that "an injured guest and an agreeable host may be anx-
ious to see compensation paid so long as the host does not have
to pay it."88 The danger of collusion is especially clear when, as
in Ramey, the host and the guest are husband and wife. In Bick-
ford, the Georgia Supreme Court also addressed this issue stat-
ing: "Here again, we must defer to legislative judgment. That
the rule may also bar some claims is not a sufficient ground to
hold the guest passenger classification as violative of the equal
protection clause.
'3 9
Although its conclusion was expressed in terms of the mini-
mum rationality standard, 0 the South Carolina Supreme Court
appeared to utilize a higher standard of scrutiny in its analysis
33. 240 Ga. 255, 240 S.E.2d 24 (1977).
34. Id. at 257, 240 S.E.2d at 26-27.
35. Id. at 257, 240 S.E.2d at 27.
36. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 884.
37. Id. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 885.
38. 240 Ga. at 257-58, 240 S.E.2d at 27.
39. Id. at 258, 240 S.E.2d at 27.
40. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 883.
1980]
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of Ramey. The policy of preventing collusive lawsuits, though
perhaps not as strong a rationale as it once was, nevertheless,
remains a valid objective of the statute.41 The court conceded
that the statute served to prevent collusive lawsuits.42
Under its enunciated standards, the court then should have
determined only whether the prevention of collusion was ration-
ally related to a classification based on the relationship of driver
to nonpaying guest. If the two are reasonably connected, the
court should defer to the judgment of the legislature. Instead,
the court concluded that since the statute also prevented meri-
torious claims it was not "the proper way to ferret out fraudu-
lent actions. . . . [W]e cannot accept the premise that the sup-
posed prevention of collusive lawsuits may justify a statute
which bars meritorious litigation. 4 3 Arguably, in making this
determination, the court went beyond the requirement of a rea-
sonable relation and scrutinized the relative merits of the
method chosen by the legislature as against other means of
reaching the intended legislative objective.
The standard of review utilized by the court conflicts with
the standard that is firmly established in this state. In Univer-
sity of South Carolina v. Mehlman," the court stated the rule
for judicial review of state statutes as follows:
[I]t is a well settled rule in this State that a statute will, if
possible, be construed so as to render it valid; that legislative
Act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance
to the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt; that
every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutional-
ity of a legislative enactment; that it will be declared unconsti-
tutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave
no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of
the Constitution; that all reasonable presumptions must be
made in favor of the validity of the Act; and that the Constitu-
tion of South Carolina is a limitation upon, rather than a grant
of, legislative power.
45
41. 240 Ga. at 258, 240 S.E.2d at 27.
42. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 883.
43. Id.
44. 245 S.C. 180, 139 S.E.2d 771 (1964). See also Nolletti v. Nolletti, 243 S.C. 20,
132 S.E.2d 11 (1963); Clarke v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E.
481 (1935).
45. 245 S.C. at 185, 139 S.E,2d at 774.
[Vol. 32
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In State v. Smith,4 the court declared that "[s]tate legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de-
spite the fact that in practice their laws result in some inequity.
A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."'47 It is not clear
on what basis the Ramey court found that the statute's "re-
pugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable
doubt."4 The guest statute has been part of the statutory law of
South Carolina for fifty years.49 Cases concerning this statute
have been before the court on numerous occasions,50 but the
court had never questioned the constitutionality of the statute.
The court in Ramey did not indulge all reasonable presumptions
in favor of the validity of the guest statute as was required pre-
viously under Mehlman and Smith.
The court also declared that the statute was "doubly oner-
ous, as it is limited to motor vehicles and is accordingly defec-
tive under Marley, and it irrationally distinguishes nonpaying
guests from paying passengers." 51 The United States Supreme
Court in Silver v. Silver, however, reached the opposite
conclusion:
It is said that the vice in the statute is not that it distinguishes
between passengers who pay and those who do not, but be-
tween gratuitious passengers in automobiles and those in other
classes of vehicles. But it is not so evident that no grounds ex-
ist for the distinction that we can say a priori that the classifi-
cation is one forbidden as without basis, and arbitrary.52
The South Carolina court, in distinguishing Silver, stated that
the Supreme Court in that case "did not consider the two histor-
ical justifications. . . to determine if there was a rational con-
nection between the objectives of the statute and the means pro-
46. 271 S.C. 317, 247 S.E.2d 331 (1978).
47. Id. at 320, 247 S.E.2d at 332.
48. University of South Carolina v. Mehhman, 245 S.C. 180, 185, 139 S.E.2d 771, 774
(1964).
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 5908 (1932).
50. Since the enactment of the guest statute, the South Carolina Supreme Court has
reviewed no fewer than fifty cases concerning the Act.
51. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 886. It is also interesting to note that S.C. CODE
ANN. § 55-1-10 (1976) applies to aircraft the recovery limitations of the guest statute.
52. 280 U.S. at 123.
19801
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vided to accomplish the objectives.""3 As a result, the South
Carolina court found that Silver's limited scope precluded it
from being either controlling or persuasive.5 4 The United States
Supreme Court, however, has never overruled Silver.55
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in holding the guest
statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, broke with
the majority of state courts which have held their statutes con-
stitutional in the face of similar attacks.5 6 Ramey, following so
closely the decision in Marley, makes clear that the court will
look initially at statutes separately classifying automobile-re-
lated negligence. A difficulty arising from the court's conclusory
analysis in Ramey, however, is the uncertainty it introduces into
the area of equal protection in South Carolina. The presump-
tions of constitutionality traditionally utilized by the court to
approach equal protection problems are curiously absent in
Ramey. Furthermore, the classification imposed by the statute
appears rationally related to a valid legislative purpose. As Jus-
tice Littlejohn stated in his well-written dissent, "[t]he legisla-
ture was entitled to consider the relationship between a driver
and a nonpaying passenger in enacting the legislation here in-
volved. Classification is primarily for the legislature, and the
courts should not interfere unless classification is clearly
unreasonable. 5 7
I. MAGISTRATES' COURTS
A. Advisory Election of Magistrates
The constitutionality of advisory primary elections to deter-
53. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 885.
54. Id.
55. On November 8, 1976, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for
certiorari in Sidle v. Majors, 429 U.S. 945 (1976). That case concerned a constitutional
challenge of the Indiana guest statute. In Hicks v. Maranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), the
Supreme Court held that state courts and lower federal courts are bound to the same
extent by the Supreme Court's summary dismissal of appeals as by the Court's disposi-
tion after plenary consideration. Thus, contrary to the South Carolina court's conclusion,
Silver remains persuasive authority with respect to the United States Constitution. Fur-
thermore, while the federal cases do not dispose of the equal protection claim under the
South Carolina Constitution, they are persuasive and entitled to much weight. Accord-
ingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court should not have dismissed the holding in Silver
so lightly.
56. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
57. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 887 (Littlejohn, J. dissenting).
[Vol. 32
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mine nominees for gubernatorial appointment to magisterial of-
fice was tested in two cases consolidated for review in State v.
Pechilis.55 Both cases were brought by the Attorney General
pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act5" and
heard under the original jurisdiction of the South Carolina
Supreme Court. One action"0 was commenced to determine
"whether or not the practice of certified political parties advi-
sory primary elections for nominations to the office of magistrate
violates article V, section 4 of the South Carolina Constitu-
tion." 1 The State sought to enjoin the defendants and those
they represented 2 from either "participating in or holding advi-
sory primary elections .... ,,63 The other action"4 was brought
to determine whether a state statute 5 authorizing the Com-
missioners of Election for Spartanburg County to conduct such
elections violated the South Carolina and United States
Constitutions. 6
Although the State challenged the advisory elections on sev-
eral constitutional grounds, the supreme court considered one is-
58. - S.C. -, 258 S.E.2d 433 (1979).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (1976).
60. This action was brought against "Nick Peters Pechilis, John B. Halloran, Jr.,
and Richard A. Patterson, individually and as representatives of all other candidates for
nomination by advisory election to the office of magistrate, and against the Democratic
Party of South Carolina and the Republican Party of South Carolina, individually and as
representatives of all other certified political parties in South Carolina. . . "State v.
Pechilis, - S.C. -, -, 258 S.E.2d 433, 433 (1979).
61. Brief of Plaintiff at 3-4.
62. See note 60 supra.
63. Brief of Plaintiff at 4.
64. This action was instituted against "Joseph E. Hines, Jr., L. Paul Barnes and C.
Tyrone Gilmore as Commissioners of Election for Spartanburg County, South Carolina,
and their successors in office . . . ." -, S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 433.
65. See 1956 S.C. Acts 1716, No. 714, as amended by 1972 S.C. Acts 3044, No. 1559.
The statute provides:
Effective in 1976 the magistrates in Spartanburg County shall be nomi-
nated for appointment at the general election by the voters residing in their
respective districts. Candidates for magistrates shall not be nominated in party
primaries or conventions but by petitions signed by one hundred or more qual-
ified electors residing in the magisterial district. Upon petition being filed with
the Spartanburg County Election Commission not later than sixty days prior
to the date of the holding of the general election and the payment to the
county treasurer of a one hundred dollar filling fee, the names of the nominees
shall be placed upon the ballot.
Id.
66. Brief of Plaintiff at 4-5. The specific articles allegedly violated were S.C. CONST.
art. I, §§ 3, 8 & art. V, §§ 4, 23 and U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
9
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sue critical: "we need only consider the contention that elections
impermissibly chill the constitutional process which prescribes
the manner in which magistrates are to be selected." 7 The su-
preme court held that the magisterial elections did not pass con-
stitutional muster primarily for two reasons. First, the court
found that a literal interpretation of the state constitution pro-
hibited such election. 8 Second, the court concluded that magis-
terial elections conducted by Commissioners of Election or by
political parties impermissibly chill the Governor's constitution-
ally granted discretionary power to appoint magistrates.
6 9
In South Carolina, a magistrate is a judicial officer ap-
pointed pursuant to the state constitution, which provides that
"[t]he Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint a number of magistrates for each county as
provided by law."'7 0 Strictly construing the constitution, the
court declared that "[s]ince the Constitution clearly and plainly
states that magistrates shall be appointed, we must assume that
every other method of selection was excluded, including election
by popular vote." 7' In the court's view, this constitutional provi-
sion sets forth an exclusive method of selection for magistrates;
thus, any statute or requirement which operates to defeat the
express language of the foregoing provision must be struck down
as unconstitutional. The court noted, however, that in spite of
this constitutional language, for many years political parties
have used preferential primary elections in some counties as a
method to select nominees for gubernatorial appointments.72 In
addition, the legislature has enacted numerous statutes provid-
ing for nominating elections of magistrates.73 The nominating
elections are not binding on the Governor. His magisterial ap-
pointments are not necessarily determined by the statutorily
mandated election process. Rather, the election merely provides
67. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 433.
68. Id. at _, 258 S.E.2d at 434.
69. Id. at , 258 S.E.2d at 434-35.
70. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 23.
71. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 434.
72. Id.
73. See 1974 S.C. Acts 2102, No. 974; 1968 S.C. Acts 3118, No. 1333; Id. at 2361, No.
970; Id. No. 969; 1967 S.C. Acts 27, No. 25; 1966 S.C. Acts 3055, No. 1225; 1964 S.C. Acts
2436, No. 1073; Id. at 2323, No. 1011; Id. at 1888, No. 808; 1962 S.C. Acts 2151, No. 859;
1958 S.C. Acts 1876, No. 881; 1956 S.C. Acts 1716, No. 714; 1954 S.C. Acts 1439, No. 563.
[Vol. 32
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a means by which the state senate may assess local public senti-
ment as an aid to fulfilling its constitutional duty to provide
"advice and consent" to the Governor. 4
The court has previously stated in Young v. Sapp,75 that
The nominations for magistrates do not conflict with any pro-
visions of our constitution ... but ... appear to be in con-
formity with the constitutional provisions. As a matter of fact
and of law, the nomination of a candidate for magistrate by the
Democratic party, or any other party, is simply a suggestion to
the Governor of the State of a suitable person to be appointed
by him as magistrate.
7 6
Thus, the Governor "may ignore such recommendation, and
make such appointment as he thinks fit and proper, subject to
confirmation by the Senate. '77 Breeden v. Democratic Executive
Committee78 concerned a contested preferential election for
Marlboro County auditor; the auditor's office like that of magis-
trate was filled by gubernatorial appointment with the advice
and consent of the senate. The court concluded that "the par-
ties are entitled to have determined and presented to the Gover-
nor the lawful nominee of the party so that he may have an op-
portunity, if he chooses, to honor the suggestion made by the
electorate in the primary. '7' The appointee "obtains title to of-
fice not by nomination in a Democratic primary but by appoint-
ment by the Governor and confirmation by the Senate. . . the
primary is the chosen method of suggesting [candidates] to the
Governor .... 80
The Pechilis court stated that the constitutionality of advi-
sory elections was not at issue in Young or Breeden and that the
cases were not controlling. 1 The court rejected defendant's ar-
gument that the Governor is not bound to accept the elected
nominees and found instead, that "[w]ith the overwhelming ac-
74. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 27.
75. 167 S.C. 364, 166 S.E. 354 (1932). See also Breeden v. Democratic Executive
Comm., 226 S.C. 204, 84 S.E.2d 723 (1954); Weston v. Williams, 190 S.C. 112, 2 S.E.2d
381 (1939).
76. 167 S.C. at 370, 166 S.E. at 356-57.
77. Id. at 370, 166 S.E. at 357.
78. 226 S.C. 204, 84 S.E.2d 723 (1954).
79. Id. at 208, 84 S.E.2d at 725.
80. Weston v. Williams, 190 S.C. 112, 114, 2 S.E.2d 381, 382 (1939).
81. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 435.
19801
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ceptance through the years by the Governor and the Senate of
the nominees of the magisterial elections, candidates are, for all
practical purposes, forced to enter the popular election process
to become magistrate. 8 2 The court determined, therefore, that
the decisive factor in this case was not the advisory nature of the
elections but the effect of the elections upon the exercise of the
appointive power.
The practical effect of the statute and the party primaries,
according to the court, was to virtually assure that nominees
elected would be appointed by the Governor and approved by
the senate, while those who were not elected or refused to enter
such elections would be precluded from nomination and consid-
eration for the office. The court found that "[tihe undeniable
purpose of the elections held pursuant to statute and by the po-
litical parties is to use the election machinery to coerce the Gov-
ernor into appointing and the Senate into confirming the nomi-
nees of the election, regardless of his or her qualifications
1)83
The court decided "[t]he clear effect of such primaries is to
chill the constitutional selection process and abridge the discre-
tionary power of the Governor to appoint magistrates. ' ' " Thus,
the court held that elections held pursuant to the challenged
statute or by party primary clearly violated article V, section 23,
of the South Carolina Constitution and the court permanently
restrained and enjoined further attempts to hold advisory elec-
tions for magistrates. 5 The court's resolution of this issue may
have a profound impact on the selection of magistrates since
"[flor many years, at least half a century, some county organiza-
tions within the South Carolina Democratic Party have con-
ducted magisterial primaries. 
'
86
B. Magistrate Juries
In State v. Warren,87 the South Carolina Supreme Court
82. Id. In November, 1976, the first election pursuant to the challenged statute was
conducted. The only persons appointed to the office of magistrate were those nominated
through the advisory election. Record at 61, 72.
83. - S.C. at -, 258 S.E.2d at 434-35.
84. Id. at -, 258 SE.2d at 435.
85. Id.
86. Brief of Defendant Democratic Party of South Carolina at 2.
87. 273 S.C. 159, 255 S.E.2d 668 (1979).
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held that certain state statutes" providing for magistrate juries
in criminal cases are unconstitutional as violative of the sixth89
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
The defendant was arrested while participating in an anti-nu-
clear demonstration.9" He was convicted of trespassing and sen-
tenced to fifteen days or a $100 fine.91 At trial in magistrate's
court, defendant attacked t h e constitutionality of these state
statutes and contended that the manner of jury selection at his
trial violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights.92 His
argument, however, was rejected by the presiding magistrate and
the circuit court affirmed. The supreme court held the statutes
unconstitutional; it was not necessary for the court to reach the
issue of the fairness of the jury selection in this particular case.
93
88. These statutes provide:
Every person arrested and brought before a magistrate, charged with an of-
fense within his jurisdiction, shall be entitled on demand to a trial by jury
which shall be selected as provided in § 22-3-780.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-770 (1976).
In criminal causes in a magistrate's court a jury shall be selected in the
following manner: The sheriff, constable or other officer appointed by the mag-
istrate shall write and fold up eighteen ballots, each containing the name of a
respectable voter of the vicinity. He shall deliver the ballots to the magistrate,
who shall put them into a box and shake them together, and the officer shall
draw out one, and the person so drawn shall be one of the jury unless chal-
lenged by either party. The officer shall thus proceed until he shall have drawn
six who shall not have been challenged. Neither party shall be allowed more
than six challenges. But if the first twelve drawn shall be challenged and the
parties do not agree to a choice, 'the last six shall be the jury. When any of the
six jurors so drawn cannot be had or are disqualified by law to act in the case
and the parties do not supply the vacancy by agreement, the officer shall pro-
ceed to prepare, in the manner before directed, ballots for three times the
number thus deficient, which shall be disposed of and drawn as above
provided.
Id. § 22-3-780. These statutes were repealed following the court's decision in this case.
1979 S.C. Acts -, No. 164.
89. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state wherein the crime shall have been
committed." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
90. Brief of Appellant at 2.
91. Id. at 3.
92. 273 S.C. at 160, 255 S.E.2d at 668.
93. The appellant's jury was drawn from a list of forty potential jurors selected by
the Chief Deputy Sheriff of Barnwell County. Record at 41-43. The Chief Deputy and
the Sheriff Department's secretary went "through the [voter] registration books and got
people from the Barnwell area in all types of business." Id. at 43. The selection process
apparently took place at the Sheriff's Department Office. Id. at 42-43. The voter registra-
13
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Under the statutes, a magistrate was permitted to appoint
"[tihe sheriff, constable, or other officer. . ." to select eighteen
"respectable voter[s] of the vicinity,"'" from whom a jury was
selected. The court held that the statutes failed to meet consti-
tutional requirements for two reasons: (1) "there is given the
magistrate the authority to look about him and to select a per-
son to choose a jury panel. . ." and (2) "it permits the person
selected an almost unbridled authority to find 18 'respectable
voters' from whom a jury of 6 will be selected to try a particular
criminal case." 96 The main concerns of the court, therefore, ap-
peared to be the broad discretion entrusted to the person select-
ing the jury panel and the attendant potential for abuse arising
from the magistrate's discretionary power to appoint a sheriff to
select a jury. "The sheriff, because of his office, is allied with the
State, which is the prosecuting authority.
'9 7
The court declared that the sixth amendment encompasses
the right to a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of
the community and impartial in a specific case.98 This analysis is
consistent with prevailing case law. 9 The court then found that
the statutory method of drawing a magistrate's jury did "not
tend to assure a cross-section of citizens fairly representative of
tion list from which the jury was selected included information concerning the regis-
trant's race, sex, and place of employment. Id. at 43. The Deputy Sheriff testified that no
systematic selection method was used; rather he "just drew out from the registration
book a list of people from the Barnwell area and wrote the names down on [a] piece of
paper." Id.
Of the forty potential jurors drawn, two were black and two were women. Id. Of the
9000 registered voters in Barnwell, 36.58 percent were black and 52.59 percent were wo-
men. Brief of Appellant at 6. See Record at 45.
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-780. For full text of this statute see note 88 supra.
95. 273 S.C. at 161-62, 255 S.E.2d at 669.
96, Id. at 162, 255 S.E.2d at 669.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. The United States Supreme Court has "unambiguously declared that the Ameri-
can concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). In Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128 (1940), a unanimous Court stated that "[i]t is part of the established tradition in the
use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative
of the community." Id. at 130, quoted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). The fair cross-section requirement was
made binding on the states in Taylor, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), in which the Supreme Court
held this requirement to be fundamental to the sixth amendment right to trial by jury.
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the community." 100 The court noted that, while this method of
jury selection could result in a fair trial, the selection process did
not provide sufficient assurance of a fair trial.10 1 Moreover, any
resultant prejudice would be of "the type . . . difficult, if not
impossible in most cases, to prove."102 For these reasons the
court held the statute unconstitutional as violative of the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution 03 as made appli-
cable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.10 The court
concluded that "the fundamental right to trial before an impar-
tial jury is so basic and crucial as to demand that no vestige of
suspicion be permitted to impugn the impartial method of selec-
tion of jurors." 10 5
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: THE RAPE SHIELD STATUTE
In State v. McCoy,0 " the South Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the South Carolina rape shield
statute.10 7 This statute establishes an exclusionary rule barring
100. 273 S.C. at 162, 255 S.E.2d at 669.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan, the Supreme Court held
that because the right to trial by jury is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,
the "fourteenth amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which-were they to be tried in federal court-would come within the sixth amend-
ment's guarantee." Id. at 149.
105. 273 S.C. at 162, 255 S.E.2d at 669.
106. - S.C. -, 261 S.E.2d 159 (1979).
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979). This statute provides:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion
evidence of the victim's sexual conduct and reputation evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct shall not be admitted in prosecutions under §§ 16-3-652 to 16-
3-656; provided, however that evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with the
defendant, or evidence of specific instances of sexual activity with persons
other than defendant introduced to show origin of semen, pregnancy or disease
about which evidence has been previously introduced at trial shall be ad-
missable [sic] if the judge finds that such evidence is relevant to a material fact
and issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not
outweigh its probative value. Provided, however, that evidence of specific in-
stances of sexual activity which would constitute adultery and would be ad-
missable [sic] under rules of evidence to impeach the creditability of the wit-
ness shall not be excluded.
(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (1),
the defendant, prior to presenting his defense shall file a written motion and
offer of proof. The court shall order an in-camera hearing to determine
15
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the admission of all reputation and opinion evidence of the vic-
tim's sexual conduct.' Subject to two exceptions, it also prohib-
its the admission of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual
conduct. The first exception provides for the admission of evi-
dence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant.
The second allows admission of specific conduct with third par-
ties to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease about
which evidence has' been previously introduced.10 Although the
statute does not prohibit all evidence of the victim's prior sexual
conduct, its "net effect is to strictly restrain the use of this type
of evidence.""10
In McCoy, the appellant was tried on charges of criminal
sexual conduct in the first degree."" At trial appellant moved to
dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the shield statute
placed "an unconstitutional limitation on due process and the
right of the defendant to a fair and impartial trial."' 2 The trial
court overruled this motion and the defendant was subsequently
convicted. On appeal defendant argued that the statute "limits
the right to confront witnesses and deprives the accused of a fair
trial in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution of the United States and their South Carolina
counterparts." 113 The United States Supreme Court has held
that the sixth amendment right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him is a "fundamental right. . . made obliga-
tory on the States by the fourteenth amendment.""14 The Court
whether the proposed evidence is admissable under subsection (1). If new evi-
dence is discovered during the presentation of the defense that may make the
evidence described in subsection (1) admissable, [sic] the judge may order an
in-camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissable
[sic] under subsection (1).
Id.
108. Prior to enactment of the rape shield statute in 1977, South Carolina followed
the common-law rule allowing the defendant charged with criminal sexual assault to in-
troduce the prosecuting witness' reputation for chastity. See State v. Taylor, 57 S.C. 483,
35 S.E. 729 (1900).
109. SC. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
110. Criminal Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 30 S.C.L. REv. 61, 61
(1979).
111. Record at 216. South Carolina statutes concerning criminal sexual conduct are
codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651, to -659.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
112. Record at 2.
113. - S.C. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 160.
114. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). See generally Smith v. Illinois, 390
[Vol. 32
16
outh Carolina Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss1/5
1980] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
has declared: "It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date
that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an
accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against
him." 11 5 Cross-examination takes on this importance because it
is a principal means "by which the credibility and veracity of a
witness is tested."1 6
The South Carolina Supreme Court, though recognizing
that "cross-examination is essential to a fair trial . . .,-" up-
held the statute against appellant's constitutional challenge. It
relied heavily on the opinions of other state courts that had up-
held the constitutionality of rape shield statutes.""8 Underlying
U.S. 129 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
115. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
116. People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 711, 257 N.W.2d 268, 272 (1977).
117. - S.C. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 160.
118. See, e.g., People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978). On upholding
the constitutionality of the Michigan rape shield statute, the Michigan Court of Appeals
declared:
The right of confrontation protected by the Sixth Amendment secures
principally the right to cross-examine witnesses .... Cross-examination is
principally a means by which the credibility and veracity of a witness is tested.
Being based upon the Sixth Amendment, defendant's challenge to the statute
thus may be stated: prohibiting the testing of the rape victim's credibility and
veracity by asking the victim about his or her sexual conduct with third per-
sons infringes upon the fundamental right of confrontation. The problem is,
however, that there is no fundamental right to ask a witness questions that are
irrelevant. Inquiry on cross-examination into the rape victim's sexual behavior
with third persons is not relevant. Evidence is relevant when it is sufficiently
probative of a fact in issue to offset the prejudice its admission produces....
The rape victim's sexual activity with third persons is in no way probative of
the victim's credibility or veracity. If it were, the relevancy would be so mini-
mal it would not meet the test of prejudice.
People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 711-12, 257 N.W.2d 268, 272 (1977)(citations
omitted). The Ohio Supreme Court, when upholding the constitutionality of a rape
shield statute, stated:
In determining whether [the Ohio shield statute] was unconstitutionally
applied in this instance, we must thus balance the state interest which the
statute is designed to protect against the probative value of the excluded
evidence.
Several legitimate state interests are advanced by the shield law. First, by
guarding the complainant's sexual privacy and protecting her from undue har-
rassment, the law discourages the tendency in rape cases to try the victim
rather than the defendant. In line with this, the law may encourage the report-
ing of rape, thus aiding crime prevention. Finally, by excluding evidence that is
unduly inflammatory and prejudicial, while only marginally probative, the stat-
ute is intended to aid in the truth-finding process.
The key to assessing the probative value of the excluded evidence is its
relevancy to the matters as proof of which it is offered. Appellants contend
17
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the court's opinion is the recognition that the prevailing policy
purpose of the shield statute is to counteract a "tendency by
counsel for persons accused of rape or criminal sexual conduct to
try the prosecutrix instead of the defendant."1 19 The court con-
cluded that the avoidance of undue prejudice towards and
unnecessary harassment of the prosecuting witness is a legiti-
mate policy goal.
120
The South Carolina rape shield statute, protects rape and
sexual assault victims from "humiliating and embarrassing pub-
lic 'fishing expeditions' into their past sexual conduct,1 21 unless
there has been a preliminary showing that the evidence to be
elicited is relevant to some issue in the case. The court found
that a probe of the prosecuting.witness' past sexual experience
"has a chilling effect on [rape] prosecutions, to the detriment of
society, while providing minimal benefit to the accused person in
his defense. 1 22 Furthermore, a woman's consent to sexual inter-
course with one person is not substantial evidence that she con-
sented with another.1 23 In modern times, the court noted, such
evidence no longer has the probative value it once had.1 24 More-
over, the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging rape vic-
tims to report crimes and to present testimony against offenders.
"That interest is served by discouraging the oftentimes pointless
and sometimes cruel treatment of victims who testify.'
' 25
Against these interests, the court weighed the claims of the ap-
pellant. It noted that the rape shield statute does not prohibit
that evidence of complainant's reputation as a prostitute is relevant to the is-
sue of consent, which was Ogletree's defense to the rape charge. The supposed
relevancy here rests on an assumption that prior unchastity with other individ-
uals indicates a likelihood of consent to the act in question with defendant.
While this premise may have had some validity in an earlier time, it seems
quite unpersuasive in today's era of more fluid morals. "As critical thought and
analysis have been brought to bear on these issues, it has become apparent
that in many instances a rape victim's past sexual conduct may have no bear-
ing at all on either her credibility or the issue of consent."
State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 17-18, 391 N.E.2d 337, 340-41 (1979)(citations
omitted).
119. - S.C. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 160.
120. Id. at -' 261 S.E.2d at 160.
121. Id. at -' 261 S.E.2d at 161.
122. Id. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 160.
123. Id. See also State v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976).
124. - S.C. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 160.
125. Id.
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all evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the defen-
dant, only reputation and opinion evidence is flatly prohibited.
The statute reflects the legislature's view of relevant evidence in
a criminal sexual prosecution.1 26 It does not deny a defendant
the right to confront the victim and reveal the evidence; it
merely requires a showing prior to admission that the evidence
is relevant to the defendant's case. 127 If the defendant desires to
introduce evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sex-
ual conduct with the defendant, he may file a written motion
and offer of proof. An in-camera hearing is then held by the
court to determine the admissibility of the proffered evidence. If
the court finds that evidence of the victim's previous sexual con-
duct is relevant, and that this relevance is not outweighed by its
potential prejudicial impact, then the defendant may introduce
that evidence at trial. If, on the other hand, the court deter-
mines that the proffered evidence is irrelevant or unduly preju-
dicial, the prosecuting witness is spared the ordeal of public
cross-examination regarding her past sexual conduct. Even if the
evidence is excluded, the offer, however, is recorded so that the
effect of the exclusion may be reviewed on appeal.
In essence, the court utilized a balancing test, as did the leg-
islature when it passed the statute. Both "considered the inter-
ests of society and prosecuting witness, while protecting the de-
fendant's constitutional rights."'128 The defendant's rights are
protected by the statute's in-camera hearing provision. The in-
troduction of evidence of specific conduct is allowed, provided it
is not unduly prejudicial and its relevance is demonstrated. The
court in McCoy recognized and preserved the balance struck by
the statute between arguably relevant evidence on the one hand
and the clear possibility of undue prejudice to the prosecuting
witness on the other.
E. Stratton Horres, Jr.
126. Id. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 161.
127. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
128. - S.C. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 161.
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